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208 PEOPLE V. GRAVES [64C.2d 
[Crim. No. 9318. In Bank. Feb. 23, 1966.] 
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, V. FRANK H. 
GRAVES, JR., Defendant .and Appellant. 
[la,lb] Criminal Law-Evidence-Admissions to Prosecuting Ot-
ficers.-In a prosecution for forgery, defendant's handwriting 
exemplars and statement that he had ohtained checks drawn 
on nonexistent accounts from persons in connection with a 
real estate transaction and did not know where the payor!! 
could he located were admissible, though defendant was not 
advised of his rights to counsel and to remain silent, where the 
statement and exemplars were obtained before his arrest and 
the purpose of the inquiry about the checks was not to elicit 
·incriminllting stlltements. 
[2] ld.-Rights of Accused-Aid of Counsel: Evidence-AdmiI-
sions to Prosecuting Officers.-The rule excluding statements 
obtained from an accused without first advising him of his 
rights to counsel and to remain silent applies only when the 
aecuslltory stage of a criminal investigation has been reached, 
that is, when officers have arre;;te« a suspect and have under-
. taken a process of interrogations that lends itself to eliciting 
incriminating statements. 
[3] ld. - Evidence - Admissions to Prosecuting Officers. - In a 
prosecution for forgery, handwriting exemplars obtained froDl 
defendant three or four days after his arrest and while he wall 
in custody were admisl>ible, though he was not first advised ot 
1Iil'; rights to counsel and to remain silent, where the police did 
not elicit incriminating statements from defendant but only 
requested and s£'eur£'d additional exemplars to make handwrit-
ing analy,;i,; easier. '1'he right to counsel during police interro-
gation was d{'signed to prevent coerced confessions, not to 
protect defendant against revealing other incriminating evi-
dence. 
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of the 
l :ity and Ccunty of San Francisco and from an order denying 
a new trial. Norman Elkington, Judge. Affirmed; appeal 
f"om order dismissed. 
Pr'osecutioll for forgery. Judgment of conviction affirmed. 
[2] See Cal.Jur.2d, Criminal Law, § 146 et seq.; Am.Jur.2d. 
Criminal Law, § 309 et seq. 
McK. Dig. References: [1,3] Criminal Law, § 448; [2] Criminal 
Law, §§ 107, 448. 
) 
) 
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[Sf C.Jd 208; 411 CaJ.Rptr. 386. 411 P.2d 1I4! 
Frank H. Graves, Jr., in pro. per., and Richard A. Bancroft 
for Defendant and Appellant. 
Thomas C. Lynch, Attorney General, Edward P. O'Brien, 
Derald E. Granberg and James T. Fousekis, Deputy Attorneys 
General, for Plaintiff and respondent. 
TRAYNOR, C. J.-Defendant appeals from a judgment of 
.conviction entered upon a jury verdict finding him guilty of 
three counts of forgery. (Pen. Code, § 470.) 
Defendant was charged with forging three checks drawn 
on the Central Valley National Bank. The checks named 
defendant as payee, and he admittedly endorsed and de-
posited them, one in his account in the First Western Bank and 
the others in the Wells Fargo Bank. The Central Valley Na-
tional Bank had no accounts in the names of the purported 
makers. 
After the checks were returned unpaid, agents of the First 
Western and Wells Fargo Banks called on defendant at his 
office. Defendant explained that he had received the checks 
from three different persons in connection with a real estate 
transaction and stated that he did not know where these men 
could be located. 
The bank agents then got in touch with Inspector Wiebe of 
the San Francisco Police Department. At his suggestion the 
agents and defendant met in the inspector's office. Defendant 
repeated his explanation, and at Inspector Wiebe's request 
wrote out two pages of handwriting exemplars, duplicating 
everything written on the faces of the three checks. Inspector 
Wiebe took defendant to the district attorncy's office, where he 
again repeated his explanation. Defendant was then arrested. 
The checks and the handwriting exemplars were turned 
over to Criminologist Williams of the San Francisco Police 
Department for examination. Three or four days later Wil-
liams asked Inspector Wiebe to obtain additional exemplars. 
\villia,IDS testified at the trial that the original exemplars were 
unsatisfactory because some of the writing on the checks was 
handprinted, and the exemplars were mostly in script. At 
Inspector Wiebe's request defendant, who was still in cus-
tody, wrote out three copies of each check on specimen check 
forms. At no time was defendant advised of his right to 
COUIlBel or of any other constitutional rights. 
The handwriting exemplars were introduced into evidence, 
and Williams testified that the handwriting on the faces of 
) 
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the forged checks matched the handwriting of People's Ex-
hibit 16 (exemplars given before arrest) and People's Exhib-
it 17 (exemplars given after arrest). The exculpatory state-
ments that defendant made before his arrest were also admitted 
into evidence. TJ:tey were substantially consistent with his testi-
mony. Defendant contends that both sets of exemplars and 
the statements should have been excluded under Escobedo v. 
Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 [84 S.Ot. 1758, 12 L.Ed.2d 977], and 
People v. Dorado, 62 Cal.2d 338 [42 Cal.Rptr. 169, 398 P.2d 
361]. . 
[la] There is no merit in the contention that the exem-
plars and statements given before arrest should have been ex-
cluded. [2] The exclusionary rule of Escobedo and Do-
rado applies only when the accusatory stage has been reached, 
that is, '" when the officers have arrested the suspect and the 
officers have undertaken a process of interrogations that lends 
itself to eliciting incriminating statements, ..• " (People v. 
Stewart, 62 Ca1.2d 571, 577 [43 Cal.Rptr. 201,400 P.2d 97].) 
[lb] Here defendant had not been arrested, and the purpose 
of the inquiry was not to elicit incriminating statements. In-
spector Wiebe learned the facts of the transaction for the first 
time at thi~ conference. It was only after the questions had been 
asked and answered and the exemplars given that the investi-
gation focused on defendant and he was placed under arrest. 
[3] The handwriting exemplars furnished after de-
fendant had been in custody for three or four days were 
also admissible. Inspector Wiebe did not elicit incriminating 
statements from defendant but only requested and seoured 
additional exemplars to make the handwriting analysis 
easier. We need not decide whether defendant could have 
invoked the privilege against self-incrimination and refused 
to make these exemplars. l The right to counsel during police 
interrogation established in Escobedo v. Illinois, supra, is de-
signed to prevent the use of coercive practices to extort con-
lNot every aid that a defendant or suspect is required to give the 
prosecution violates the privilege against self-incrimination. A defend-
ant may be ordered to stand up in court for identification, or to try on 
items of clothing. (Holt v. United States, 218 U.S. 245 [31 S.Ct. 2, 54 
L.Ed. 1021]; People v. Lopez, 60 Ca1.2d 223, 244 [32 Cal.Rptr. 424, 384 
P.2d 16].) Blood samples may be taken from a suspect without his consent, 
if the means used to obtain them do not shock the conscience. (People 
v. Duroncelay, 48 Ca1.2d 766, 770 [312 P.2d 690].) Although we have 
found no case in which an unwilling defendant who has not waived the 
privilege has been ordered to give handwriting exemplars, statements in 
some California cases and the opinions of leading writers support the 
position that the privilege is not applicable. (People v. Matteson, 61 
Cal.2d 466, 469 [39 Ca1.Rptr. 1, 393 P.2d 161]; People v. Harper, 115 
~) 
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fessions or other incriminating statements. (In re Lopez, 62 
Ca1.2d 368, 372-373 [42 Cal.Rptr. 188, 398 P.2d 380].) It 
does not protect a defendant from revealing evidence against 
himself in other ways. It applies only when" the police carry 
out a process of interrogations that lends itself to eliciting 
incriminating statements, ... " (Escobedo v. IUinois, 378 U.S. 
478, 491 [84 S.Ct. 1758, 12 L.Ed.2d 977].) In Escobedo the 
United States Supreme Court emphasized its concern with 
the problem of using coercive methods to obtain confessions. 
(378 U.S. at 490 [dissenting opinion by White, J., at pp. 498-
499].) It observed that ~y system of law enforcement that 
places primary reliance on confessions may become not only 
oppressive, but unreliable. 
In Escobedo, the court found a remedy in the Sixth 
Amendment right to counsel for the abuses it deemed inherent 
in inquisitorial methods. There is nothing in the' language or 
the logic of Escobedo, however, to indicate that this remedy is 
needed if the police have not carried out a process of interroga-
tion that lends itself to eliciting incriminating statements. Ac-
cordingly, we find no support in Escobedo for invoking the 
right to counsel to block scientific crime investigation. Reli-
ance on handwriting exemplars for expert analysis is not a 
substitute for thorough scientific investigation of crime but 
an excellent example of such investigation.2 To preclude the 
police from asking for such exemplars would foster reliance 
instead on the very inquisitorial methods of law enforcement 
that Escobedo deems suspect. 
The judgment is affirmed and the purported appeal from 
the nonappealable ot:der denying a new trial is dismissed. 
McComb, J., Tobriner, J., Mosk, J., and Burke, J., con-
curred. 
PETERS, J.-I dissent. 
I agree with the majority that the exemplars and state-
ments given before arrest were admissible under Escobedo 
and Dorado because the accusatory stage had not yet been 
Cal.App.2d 776, 779 [252 P.2d 950]; People v. Gormley, 64 Cal.App.2d 
SS6, SS8 [148 P.2d 687]; People v. Whitaker, 127 Cal.App. 370, S73 
[15 P.2d 883] ; 8 Wigmore on Evidence (McNaughton rev. 1961) § 2265; 
McCormick on Evidence (1954) § 126.) 
2' 'Handwriting identification is. based upon tbe principle that every 
person's handwriting is distinctive. . • . The possibility tbat one person 
eould imitate the handwriting of another and successfully deceive an 
expert document examiner is very remote." (Report of The President 'I 
Commission on tbe AIsa8sination of President Kennedy, pp. 567-568.) 
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reached when they were secured. Defendant was not then in 
custody and the investigation had not yet focused on him. 
But, according to the expert, those exemplars were unsatis-
factory because they were mostly in script, while the checks 
upon which the charge was based were mostly handprinted, 
At the request of the expert several new sets of exemplars were 
then secured after arrest, and at the accusatory stage, with-
out informing the defendant of his rights to counsel and to 
remain silent. These exemplars were admitted into evidence 
and constitute the main evidence of guilt. It is my opinion 
that the admission of these exemplars was prejudicial error, and 
requires reversal. I cannot agree with the majority that the 
rights guaranteed by Escobedo and Dorado do not apply to 
these exemplars admittedly secured after the accusatory 
stage had been reached. 
The majority reason that the right to counsel only applies 
to the elicitation of statements from 'the defendant and not to 
the elicitation of evidence in other forms. It is stated that 
"The right to counsel during police interrogation established 
in Escobedo v. Illinois, supra, is designed to prevent the use 
of coercive practices to extort confessions or other incriminat-
ing statements. [Citation.] It does not protect a defendant from 
reveallng evidence against himself in other ways. " The majority 
conclude, therefore, that it is unnecessary to reach the ques-
tion whether handwriting exemplars fall within the privilege 
against self-incrimination. 
The limitation of Escobedo and Dorado to evidence given in~­
the form of statements is, in my opinion, unsound. It is con-
trary to the very purpose upon which the right to counsel 
during police interrogation at the accusatory stage is predi-
cated. 
The United States Supreme Court in Escobedo was pri-
marily interested in preventing improper police tactics which 
spawned involuntary confessions. It concluded that the pres-
ence of counsel would go far to eradicate such tactics. (In re 
Lopez, 62 Ca1.2d 368, 372-373 [42 Cal.Rptr. 188, 398 P.2d 
380].) But those coercive practices thus sought to be re-
stricted are not limited to obtaining confessions in the form 
of statements from an accused. There is no legal difference 
between a defendant being coerced into obtaining for the 
police documents or real evidence not otherwise obtainable by 
legal process, and being coerced into giving incriminating 
statements. There is no guarantee that coercive methods wiU 
not be used by the police to obtain documents or chattels 
) 
) 
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which are unobtainable by a search warrant because their 
location is unknown and unobtainable by legal compulsion 
because the use of such compulsion would violate the defend-
ant's privilege against self-in~rimination. Coercion CHn also be 
used to elicit incriminating conduct. In People v. Furnish, 63 
Ca1.2d 511 [47 Cal. Rptr. 387, 407 P.2d 299], thc defendant 
gave incriminating statements after the accusatory stage had 
arisen and then went through a reenactment of the crime 
where it took place. Movies were taken of the reenactment, 
but we did not pass on their admissibility since th<>y were not 
introduced into evidence. If the movies had been admitted. 
we certainly could not conclude that because such evidence of 
defendant's participation in the crime was not contained in 
statements, it was admissible even though the defendant was 
110t advised of his right to counsel and was persuaded to 
perfom the reenactment by means of a process of interrogations 
designed to elicit such evidence. That handwriting exemplars 
may be coerced from a defendant in the same mann<>r as are 
statements is clearly shown by People v. Matteson, 61 Ca1.2d 
466 [39 Cal.Rptr. 1, 393 P.2d 161], wherein we held hand-
writing exemplars obtained by brutality to be inadmissible 
under Rochin v. State of Cal1form'a, 342 U.S. 165 [72 S.Ct. 
205,96 L.Ed. 183,25 A.L.R.2d 1396]. 
It is evident that coercive methods or other improper police 
practices can be used to elicit incriminating evidence through 
several other forms than through statements. In each case the 
accused is persuaded to obtain or create evidence against 
himself. The fact that such evidence is usually obtained 
through statements, since this method requires the least 
action on the part of the accused and hence the least amount 
of persuasion, does not obviate the danger that coercive 
methods will be used to ohtain evidence in other ways. On the 
contrary, because the obtaining or creating of nonverbal evi-
dence generally requires more active participation on the 
part of the accused, there is a greater danger that coercive 
methods will be used to obtain SUCll evidence. The right to 
counsel matures when the accusatory stage arises. (Escobedo 
v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 492 [84 S.Ct. ]758, 12 L.Ed.2d 
9i7].) Since counsel would be no less valuable in preventing 
cucrcioll of evidence in forms other than statements, I cannot 
distinguish between the forms of incriminating evidence in 
tlctermilling the rig-ht to counsel at this stage. 
Once it is cOlleludf'd that the rules of Escobedo apply to 
obtaining evidence from tlle defendant through other forms 
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than through statements alone, it becomes necessary to d.eter-
mine whether tIle particular form in which the evidence is 
obtained falls within tIle privilege against self-incrimination. 
This is the real key to the problem here involved. The right 
to counsel serves no real purpose when a defendant is re-
quested to give evidence which could be compelled by legal 
process since the police do not then have the incentive to 
resort to illegal methods of obtaining the evidence. Moreover, 
advice of counsel to refuse giving evidence which is not with-
in the privilege would be of little help if the defendant haa 
no legal right to refuse. 
The majority, without determining whether the privilege 
against self-incrimination is applicable to handwriting exem-
plars, and relying primarily on People v. Matteson, supra, 61 
Ca1.2d 466, strongly indicate that it is not. (Majority opin-
ion, fn. t.) It should be mentioncd that Matteson did not 
decide' the question because the exemplars there involved 
werc held to be inadmissible under Roc1tin whether or not the 
privilege against self-incrimination was applicable. (People 
v. Matteson, Sll.pra, at p. 469.) We have recently recognized 
that the question is an open one in this state. (People v. 
Gilbert, 63 Ca1.2d 690, 708-709 [47 Cal.Rptr. 909, 408 P.2d 
365).} 
It is true, as the majority state, that not every aid that a 
defendant or suspect is required to give the prosecution vio-
lates the privilege against self-incrimination. An accused can 
be fingerprinted, photographed, and measured without his 
consent; he may be ordered to stand up in court for identifi-
cation or to tryon items of clothing; blood samples may be 
taken from a suspect without his consent if the means used to 
obtain them do not shock the conscience. (See Holt v. United 
States, 218 U.S. 245 [31 8.Ct. 2, 54 L.Ed. 1021) ; People v. _____ _ 
Lopez, 60 Ca1.2d 223, 244 [32 Cal.Rptr. 424, 384 P.2d 16) ; I 
People v. Duroncelay, 48 Ca12d 766, 770 [312 P.2d 690).) In 
tIle above cases, however, the evidence sought relates to the 
physical characteristics of the defendant and is already in 
existence. l It is universally conceded that one can rely on the 
privilege in refusing to produce documents or cllattels in the 
lIn People v. Atchley, 53 CnJ.2d ]60 [346 P.2d 764], the defendant 
was required on eross,cx:lIllination t.o put on the shirt he hnd worn on 
the night of the killing, to ~how how he had ('arried the gun, and to 
demonstrate wit.h nn llssistant 11;« ,.j,.!. IIttCJrlwy his and llis wife'8 move. 
ments during the struggl!'. We lIPid t.hat he had waived his privilege 
against self·innilllin:,tion :is to lhC'sp. mnU!'I'S whc'lI he voluntarily raised 
them on direct eaxmination. (53 C"l.2d at pp. ]73·174.) 
Feb. 1966] PEOPLE V. GRAVES 215 
[64 C.2d 208; 49 Cal.Rptr. 386, 411 P.2d 114J 
face of a subpoena or other legal process. (Boyd v. United 
States, 116 U.S. 616, 622 [6 S.Ct. 524, 29 L.Ed. 746]; 8 
Wigmore on Evidence (McNaughton Rev. 1961) § 2264.) 
There is a similarity between compelling a defendant to pro-
duce a document and compelling him to furnish a specimen 
of his handwriting for in both cases the witness is required to 
actively procure evidence against llimself which is not then 
present. As stated by one court in dealing with handwriting 
exemplars, "the present case is more serious than that of 
compelling the production of documents or chattels, because 
here the witness is compelled to write and create, by means of 
the act of writing, evidence which does not exist, and which 
may identify him as the falsifier." (Beltram v. Samson 
(1929) 53 Philippine 570, 577.) It would be a strange para-
dox if a defendant could successfully invoke the privilege 
against self-incrimination in refusing to obtain existing sam-
ples of his handwriting, yet could be required to create simi-
lar samples by legal compulsion. Compelling a defendant to 
create samples of his handwriting can certainly not be re-
garded as less objectionable than compelling him to obtain 
samples already created. Since the samples can be used to 
prove that the accused wrote the forged checks, they are as 
much testimonial disclosures as are verbal admissions by the 
accused that he is the falsifier. 
It is also unreasonable to hold or to imply that the police, 
without advising a defendant of his right to counsel, can 
obtain handwriting exemplars at the accusatory stage which 
show that he wrote the forged checks, when, admittedly, they 
could not request his verbal admission that he wrote those 
checks. A limitation of Escobedo to the elicitation of state-
ments would encourage the police to obtain evidence from a 
defendant in other forms which are within the privilege 
against self-incrimination without advising him of his right 
to counsel. Admission of such evidence must therefore be held 
to constitute a violation of the right to counsel during the 
accusatory stage as established in Escobedo. 
The question remains whether the error in the present case 
requires reversal. The evidence gained from the exemp1ars 
must be regarded as admissions contained in attempted ex-
People v. Lopez, supra, 60 Cal.2d 223, 244, contains dicta that a de· 
fendant may be required to speak for voice identification, but, even if 
this dicta were correct, there is 110 support for it in the cases cited as 
authority for this proposition. (See People v. DU1'oncelay, supra, 48 
Cal.2d 766; People v. Trujillo, 32 CaJ.2d 105 [194 P.2d 681].) 
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culpatory statements since it cannot be assumed that defend-
ant had any intention of confessing in view of his consistent 
denials of having written the checks which brought about the 
prosecution. The error in admitting the exemplars is there-
fore subject to the test of prejudice. (People v. HiUery, 62 
Cal:2d 692,712 [44 Cal.Rptr. 30, 401 P.2d 382].) 
Under the People's theory of the case, the conviction of 
defendant is based solely upon the premise that he was the 
person who had filled ont the face of each of the three checks. 
Defendant consistently denied this both before the· trial and 
as a witness at the trial. There is no direct testimony to the 
contrary. Obviously, the jury found that defendant had filled 
out the checks in question. In so finding, the jury must have 
relied upon and accepted the testimony of the expert that 
defendant was the person who had done the writing on the 
f;tce of the checks. AB already pointed out, the exemplars 
properly obtained were unsatisfactory, and apparently in-
sufficient to convict. The expert's opinion that defendant 
wrote the checks must have been primarily based on the 
second set of exemplars Hlegally obtained. This requires a 
reversal because there is n.ot only a reasonable possibility that 
the evidence complained· of might have contributed to the 
conviction (Fahy v. Connecticut, 375 U.S. 85, 86 [84 S.Ot. 
229, 11 L.Ed2d 171]) but there is a reasonable probability 
tIl at a result more favorable to the defendant· would have 
been reached if the evidence illegally obtained had not been 
erroneously admitted. (People v. WatsDn, 46 Ca1.2d 818, 837 
[299 P.2d 243].) 
I would reverse the judgment. 
Peek, J., concurred. 
Appellant's petition for a rehearing was denied March 22, 
1966. Peters, J., and Peek, J., were of the opinion that the 
petition should be granted. 
